Introduction
In this paper, I incorporate strategic behavior by the management into credit risk models where investors have only incomplete information about the value of the assets of the company. Credit risk models are often divided into structural models and reduced form models. In structural models an asset value process is specified.
Default occurs when the value of the assets is lower than a given boundary, e.g. the nominal value of the liabilities. The first structural models were Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) . In these models it is assumed that equity is a call option on the assets of a company with a strike price equal to the nominal value of debt.
As a consequence, the price of corporate debt is the value of the assets minus the value of the call option or alternatively the value of a risk free bond minus a put option written on the assets. While in these early models default is only possible at maturity, Black and Cox (1976) allow for default prior to maturity. In their model default occurs when an asset value process hits the default boundary for the first time. Structural models that incorporate assumptions about the optimal capital structure are Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996) . Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) include a stochastic interest rate into the structural model framework. Besides their role in academia, structural models have also proven to be successful in the banking industry. The company KMV provides a structural credit risk model to calculate the expected default frequency. A description of the KMV model is given in Bohn and Crosby (2003) . Although structural models are a good description of an economic situation, they fail to explain the observed credit spreads in bond and credit derivative markets. Since the asset value process is usually specified as a pure diffusion process, credit spreads should be close to zero for short times to maturity. But this is not the case. Reduced form models avoid this problem by modeling default as the first jump of a pure jump process, typically a Poisson process.
Default intensities and recovery rates are assigned exogenously to the model. It is possible to calibrate reduced form models to market prices of debt. In contrast to structural models, default is not predictable. Models which study reduced form models are Artzner and Delbaen (1995) , Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) , Duffie and Singleton (1999) , and Lando (1998) . Reduced form models do not specify an asset value process and do not use accounting based information. That is the reason why they are criticized for lacking economic content.
On first view, structural models and reduced form models seem to be very different. This is not necessarily the case. Duffie and Lando (2001) are the first to show that structural models can be transferred into reduced form models by reducing the information set of the market participants. In their model, they assume that the investors cannot observe the true asset value process, but instead receive a noisy signal about the asset value, for example an accounting report. Duffie and Lando (2001) show that with the reduced information set, a structural model admits an intensity, hence default is unpredictable. Giesecke (2005) extends this idea to the case where the default barrier is unobservable, Zhou (2001) adds an unpredictable jump time to the asset value process, and Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Helwege (2002) assume that investors receive lagged information about the asset value process. Baglioni and Cherubini (2005) distinguish between noisy accounting information resulting from estimation errors and noisy accounting information resulting from fraud. Further models that assume incomplete information about the asset value process are Giesecke and Goldberg (2004) , Cetin, Jarrow, Protter and Yildirim (2004) , Frey and Schmidt (2006) and Guo, Jarrow and Zeng (2005) .
In this paper, the focus will be on credit risk models with an incomplete information structure as given in Duffie and Lando (2001) . In their model, it is assumed that the noisy accounting signal consists of the true asset value and a normally distributed noise term. Furthermore, it is assumed that the true asset value process and the noise term are uncorrelated. But in practice the true asset value and the noise term are not necessarily uncorrelated, because the management of the company acts opportunistically. Numerous studies in the accounting literature give evidence that the management of a company has incentives to do earnings management. Many of these studies come to the conclusion that companies prefer to report smooth asset values through time. Smoothed asset values mean that in the model of Duffie and Lando (2001) the true asset value term and the noise term are negatively correlated.
Other studies come to the conclusion that the management reacts to bonus schemes which can yield in a positive correlation between the true asset value term and the noise term.
With the theoretical arguments at hand, I model the opportunistic behavior of the management by a correlation between the logarithm of the true asset value process and the noise term in the model of Duffie and Lando (2001) . This is done by assuming that the two terms are bivariate normally distributed with a correlation coefficient ρ. Under this assumption, I derive a closed form formula for the pricing of corporate bonds. I then show that, for usual parametrization, the correlation between the logarithm of the asset value and the noise term is very similar to the correlation of the true asset value and the noise term.
The paper that is closest related to my paper is Coculescu, Geman and Jeanblanc (2006) . In their paper Coculescu, Geman and Jeanblanc (2006) model two different asset value processes, one for the true asset value and one for the asset value observed by the market. The asset value observed by the market is driven by two Wiener processes that can be correlated. The key difference to my paper is that by assuming two different processes the noisy process is observed continuously in time, whereas in my paper the noisy asset value is observed at discrete points in time. Modeling the observed noisy asset value discretely emphasizes the discrete nature of periodic accounting reports. Therefore I think modeling observed asset values discretely is more appropriate, especially for small companies that are not continuously covered by financial analysts.
Moreover, I study the effects of the correlation coefficient on credit spreads of corporate zero bonds. I find that a correlation introduces two pricing effects:
It (1) has a statistical effect, and it (2) has an information effect. The statistical effect arises from the new distribution of the reported asset values. For example for a negative correlation extreme asset values become less likely. The information effect says that if the investor observes a certain reported asset value, he rationally infers the asset value by taking the correlation into account. For example, if the investor observes an extreme reported asset value and the correlation is negative, the true asset value might be even more extreme. Whether the first or the second effect is dominant, depends on parameters like the standard deviation of the noise process (accounting noise) and the level of the reported asset value. I show that for small accounting noise, the statistical effect of the correlation is dominant while for medium and large accounting noise the information effect is dominant.
Furthermore, I ask the question, how large the pricing error is if the correlation is neglected. Assuming correlations scenarios of −0.4 and −0.4, I find pricing errors for corporate zero bonds with 5 years to maturity that can be positive or negative and are of significant size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives a brief review of the basic model of Duffie and Lando (2001) . In Chapter 3, I argue from a theoretical point of view that a correlation between the noise term and the true asset value process has to be included in the basic model of Duffie and Lando (2001) . In Chapter 4, I derive the conditional default probability and risky bond prices for the Duffie and Lando (2001) model enhanced with a correlation. The implications of the enhanced model are studied in Chapter 5, while Chapter 6 concludes.
2 The Basic Model of Duffie and Lando (2001) In this section, I briefly review the model of Duffie and Lando (2001) . In the model, it is assumed that the assets of a company follow a geometric Brownian motion. A default occurs when the assets are worth less than a predefined boundary. While the assumptions so far are standard in structural models, Duffie and Lando (2001) specify that investors can only observe a noisy signal V t of the asset value, e.g. an accounting report, instead of the true asset value V t . They further assume that the logarithm of the noisy signal can be decomposed into the logarithm of the true asset value and into a normally distributed noise term U t . The logarithm of the noisy signal can be written as
In Equation (1) it is assumed that ln V t and U (t) are independent. In this setup, Duffie and Lando (2001) derive the default probability of the company conditional on the noisy accounting signal and on the information whether the company is already in the default state or not. With the default probability derived under reduced information, it is possible to explain stylized facts observed in the corporate bond markets. For example, even for very small times to maturity there is still a positive default probability and hence a strictly positive credit spread. Duffie and Lando (2001) prove that -assuming the reduced information set -the default time is completely unpredictable. Therefore, they show that modeling default risk with incomplete information about the asset value can link structural models, that are based on an economic concept, to reduced form models, where default comes as a surprise.
The implications of the unobservability of the true asset values on corporate bond prices is demonstrated in Figure 1 . We see that introducing accounting noise bounds the credit spreads away from zero for very short maturities. Duffie and Lando (2001) interpret the noise term U as accounting noise. One can see in Figure 1 that the effect of the accounting noise, measured by its standard deviation, depends on the parametrization of the model. While economical considerations would predict that a higher accounting noise increases the default probability and thus credit spreads (see first graph), one can see situations where a higher level of accounting noise decreases the default probability and hence credit spreads (see second graph). To understand this anomaly, one has to keep in mind that the model of Duffie and Lando (2001) does not make any assumptions about strategic behavior of the management. Hence, we see a pure statistical effect. When the reported asset value is very low then a high accounting noise is better for the investor because the chance that the true asset value is above the reported asset value is higher than the chance that the true asset value is lower than the reported asset value. In contrast, if the accounting noise is small the investor knows for sure that the company is in a bad situation. The model of Duffie and Lando (2001) ignores possible interactions between accounting noise and true asset value models.
Motivation for a Correlation
In the basic model of Duffie and Lando (2001) it is assumed that the logarithm of the true asset value process and the noise process are uncorrelated. The expected value of the noise term can be interpreted as a reporting bias regardless of the actual value of the company. Usually, one would expect a downward bias because almost all accounting regimes report rather prudently. The standard deviation of the noise term can be interpreted as accounting noise. Accounting noise can arise even when the management of the company does not have perfect information when it assesses the asset value. As a consequence the management has to rely on estimations. And even if the management had perfect information about the asset values, it might be forced to report in accordance to accounting rules that introduce noise. Neither of the two noise parameters, expected value and standard deviation, does account for strategic behavior of the management. By allowing for correlation, it is possible to make the noise process dependent on the true asset value process. A negative correlation between the true asset value term and the noise term can be interpreted as a smoothing of reported asset values. In states in which the true asset value is relatively high, firms tend to report asset values lower than the true asset values.
In states of relatively low asset values, firms tend to report higher asset values than the true ones. Alternatively, a positive correlation has the interpretation that the management prefers high fluctuations in reported asset values. The correlation can be set by the management and is therefore a decision variable. Models that support this hypothesis are Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) , DeFond and Park (1997) , and Trueman and Titman (1988) . All studies conclude that the management has incentives to smooth reported earnings. Although, all studies come to similar results, they assume different reasons in their models. Trueman and Titman (1988) argue that the management wants to lower the costs of capital, whereas DeFond and Park (1997) and Trueman and Titman (1988) argue that managers are led by the goal to keep their job. According to the earnings smoothing hypothesis the correlation between the logarithm of the true asset value and the noise term should be negative.
The second hypothesis mainly goes back to Healy (1985) . He argues that the management observes the proceedings from operations and then chooses discretionary accruals in a way to maximize benefits from bonuses. In years where the proceedings from operations are either significantly higher or significantly lower than the bonus boundary, the management chooses negative discretionary accruals. In all other states the management chooses positive discretionary accruals. According to the hypothesis of Healy (1985) , it is not clear which sign a correlation between the logarithm of the true asset value process and the noise term would have. Closely related to the second hypothesis is the so called big bath accounting. In a bad year the company's income statements are manipulated to look even worse. As a consequence the earnings in the following years are artificially high. Taking a big bath can result in a positive correlation between the logarithm of the true asset value process and the noise term.
Although there is still a discussion in the accounting literature whether and to what extent firms smooth reported earnings, the theoretical arguments provide evidence to control for correlation in credit risk models with incomplete accounting information.
The Model of Duffie and Lando (2001) with Correlation
In this section, I extend the model of Duffie and Lando (2001) by allowing the noise term U to be correlated with the logarithm of the true asset value process.
Setup
I assume a fixed probability space (Ω,F ,P ) on which an asset value process is defined that follows a geometric Brownian motion. Under the risk neutral probability measure the asset value process is given by
where W t is a standard Wiener process under the risk neutral measure. The parameters µ and σ stand for the drift and the diffusion of a geometric Brownian motion.
Like in the setup of the basic model of Duffie and Lando (2001) , default is modeled as the first time τ that the process hits the default barrier V b . The investor cannot observe the true asset value V but instead receives noisy accounting reports V at discrete points of time t 1 , . . . , t n and the information I {τ ≤s} if the company is already in default or not. Hence, his information is modeled by the filtration (H t ) t>0 generated by
The information of the investor is different from (F t ) t>0 the filtration generated by
As in Duffie and Lando (2001) , I assume that the noisy asset value V t can be decomposed into
where Z t = ln(V t ), and -in contrast to Duffie and Lando (2001) -Z t and U t are bivariate normally distributed. The main objective is to derive the conditional density of V t given the reduced information set H t . I restrict the setup to the case where only one noisy asset value report is observed at time t. To derive the desired density, I need in a first step the density b(x|Y t , z 0 , t) of Z t stopped at τ = inf{t :
and U t are bivariate normally distributed with mean ξ = (mt + z 0 ,ū) and covariance
where m = µ − 0.5σ 2 .
Then the density b(x|Y t , z 0 , t) of Z t stopped at τ = inf{t :
on the observation Y t is given as
where
stands for the probability that min{Z s : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} > 0 given that Z starts on level z 0 − v b at time 0 and ends at level x − v b at time t. This probability can be written as
The term φ U Z (Y t − x, x) stands for the density of the bivariate normal distribution for U and Z, and φ Y (Y t ) stands for the density of the observed noisy asset value Y t , where Y t is normally distributed with mean mt + z 0 +ū and variance
In Proposition 1 I give an analytical expression for b(x|Y t , z 0 , t).
conditional on the observation Y t can analytically be written as
The variablesỹ,x, andz 0 stand for y − v b − u, x − v b , and z 0 − v b respectively.
Proof. A proof for Proposition 1 is straight forward. Inserting the definition of
into Equation (7) results after some algebra in Proposition 1.
It is known from Duffie and Lando (2001) that the density of the true asset value process g(x|y, z 0 , t) conditional on the noisy information Y and on τ > t can be calculated as b(x|y, z 0 , t) divided by the conditional survival probability Q(τ > t|Y t )
To evaluate Equation (9) analytically, one has to solve for Q(τ > t|Y t ) which can be written as
Proposition 2 gives the analytical solution of Q(τ > t|Y t ).
Proposition 2. The survival probability Q(τ > t|Y t ) conditioned on the noisy accounting information Y t can be written as Proof. The Proof is given in Appendix A.
The density g(x|y, z 0 , t) is the integral building block to derive the risk neutral default probability Q(τ < T |H t ) conditional on the reduced information set H t .
It is known that the risk neutral default probability equals 1 minus the survival probability. Hence, Q(τ < T |H t ) can be written as
Note that Q(τ ≥ T |F t ) is the survival probability under the information set F t that contains the true asset values. The probability Q(τ ≥ T |F t ) has to be weighed for every x with the density g(x|Y t , z 0 , t) to obtain the survival probability under the reduced information set H t . The risk neutral survival probability given the information set F t is well known 1 and can be written as
with
The risk neutral default probability Q(τ < T |H t ) is needed in the bond pricing model described in the following subsection.
Risky Bond Prices
In this subsection, I will derive a nearly 2 closed form pricing formula for corporate bonds. Thus, I consider a corporate bond promising the bondholders a face value F at time T . Without loss of generality, I assume further that the bond does not pay any coupon and the recovery rate ω is a constant fraction of the discounted face value of the bond. 3 Using the stated assumptions, the price of a corporate zero bond P t,T is given by
1 See e.g. Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002) , Harrison (1990) . 2 The pricing formula will be closed form up to the numerical integral in Equation (11).
3 The assumption concerning the recovery rate is called the recovery of treasure model (RTmodel). This particular assumption is often used in credit risk models, see e.g. Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) .
where B t (T ) is the price of a risk free treasury bond and Q(τ < T |H t ) is given in Equation (11). If a fixed recovery rate of the face value is assumed, the pricing formula becomes more complicated. I refer to Herkommer (2006) for calculation details under the recovery of face value assumption.
Credit Spreads
Credit Spreads are measured by the difference between the yield of treasury bonds and the yield of corporate bonds that are identical in all aspects except the credit quality. I calculate the credit spread CS as
where T − t stands for the time to maturity, P t,T stands for the price of a corporate bond, F stands for the face value of the corporate bond, and r stands for the risk free rate or the yield of a treasury bond.
Correlation between U and V
Up to now, I have introduced a correlation between the logarithm of the true asset value and the noise term. In this subsection, I will show how this correlation relates to the correlation between the true asset value and the noise term. As ln(V ) and U are bivariate normally distributed, I know from Stein's Lemma that
Inserting the well known expressions for cov(ln V, U ) and E[V ], Equation (15) simplifies to
Having found an expression for the covariance between V and U , it is now easy to calculate the correlation ρ(V, U ) between V and U
One can see in Equation (17) 
Correlation Effects

Correlation Effects and Expected Reported Asset Values
Introducing a correlation coefficient between the logarithm of the true asset value and the noise term has a direct impact on the expectation of the reported asset value.
This effect is important because the expectation of the reported asset value process is a reference point for the assessment whether the observed reported asset value is relatively high or relatively low. In the case of zero correlation, the expectation of the reported asset value V t can be written as
= e z 0 +mt+0.5σ 2 t+ū+0.5a 2 .
When the correlation is different from zero, the expectation of the reported asset value changes to
The difference between Equation (18) and Equation (19) is the term aσ √ tρ in the exponent. It is important to be aware of this difference, especially when the investor knows that the correlation is nonzero. When one analyzes the effect of introducing a correlation one has to adjust other parameters such asū or a to make
This can e.g. be done by settingū tō
With this mean adjustment one compensates for a bias that would otherwise be introduced.
Correlation Effects and Accounting Noise
In this subsection, I analyze the effect of introducing the correlation ρ between the logarithm of the true asset value process and the noise term for different levels of accounting noise a.
Base Case Parameters
The model of Duffie and Lando (2001) depends on several parameters. The base case parameters are essentially taken from Herkommer (2006) . Table 1 summarizes the parameter choices. The logarithm of the true asset value process has a risk neutral drift m of 0.07 and a diffusion σ of 0.15. The true asset value of the pre-period V 0 is set to 86.3, the default barrier is set to 60.0. As a basic security, I assume a corporate zero bond with a time to maturity of 10 years and a face value F of 100.
The interest rate r and the recovery rate ω are constants taking values of 0.04 and 0.5 respectively. The expectation of the noise processū is set according to Equation (20) to guarantee that expected reported asset values are equal to expected asset values. In such a setup, the investor anticipates that the correlation also has an effect on the reported asset values. Therefore the investor has the same reference point as in the case with zero correlation. The underlying assumption of such a mean adjustment is that the investor knows that the true asset values and the noise terms are correlated.
Statistical and Information Effect
The correlation between the logarithm of the true asset value and the accounting noise does have an impact on the pricing of corporate bonds. The pricing impact stems from two sources. The first source results from pure statistical effects. The correlation changes the distribution of the noisy accounting report V . Even if I adjust for the parameterū, as proposed in the previous subsection, the distribution of V changes. E.g. for a positive correlation, very high and very low reported asset values become more probable. Besides this pure statistical effect, the correlation also introduces what can be called an information effect. When the investor observes a noisy accounting report, and he knows that the noise term and the true asset value are correlated, he draws conclusions from this fact for his personal assessment of the default probability. E.g. when he observes an extremely high or an extremely low reported asset value and he knows that the correlation is negative, he infers that the true asset value is even more extreme. Usually, the statistical effect and the information effect have different signs. Which of these two effects is dominant, depends on other parameters such as the noise parameter a and the reported asset value V .
Numerical Example
The effect of the interaction between accounting noise and logarithm of the true asset value on credit spreads depends on the level of the reported asset values relative to the expected asset values given the parameters and the start value of the asset value process. In this setup, the expected asset value -as well as the expected reported asset value -is 93.6. I do the analysis for three different reported asset values. In the first scenario the accounting report announces a high asset value of 120, in the second scenario the accounting report announces a medium asset value of 93.6, and in the third scenario the accounting report announces a low asset value of 65. When the correlation is high, the probability of extremely high reported asset values increases. Thus, the credit spread decreases with a higher correlation. For medium and large accounting noise the information effect dominates. When the correlation is high, the investor anticipates that the high reported asset value results from the correlation. Thus, the credit spread increases with a higher correlation.
Scenario 2: Medium Reported Asset Value ( V = 93.6)
The graph for Scenario 2 is plotted in Figure 4 . One can see that for small accounting noise the credit spread is decreasing with higher correlation. For medium and large accounting noise the credit spread is increasing with increasing correlation. This can be explained as follows. The reported asset value is exactly the expectation of the unobserved asset value process. For small accounting noise the statistical effect dominates. For high positive correlations the probability of extreme reported asset values increases. Because one knows that the firm is not in default, the probability of extremely high reported asset values is higher than the probability of extremely low reported asset values. Hence, credit spreads decrease with higher correlations.
For medium and large accounting noise the information effect dominates. For small correlations the investor anticipates that the medium reported asset value arises from the negative correlation, and thus from income smoothing. Because he knows that the company has not defaulted so far, the probability that the true asset value is larger than the reported asset value is higher than the probability that the true asset value is smaller than the reported asset value. Therefore, credit spreads are decreasing for low correlations. The graph for Scenario 3 is plotted in Figure 5 . As one can see, for small accounting noise credit spreads increase as the correlation increases. For medium and large accounting noise credit spreads decrease as the correlation increases. As in Scenario 1 and 2, the behavior of the credit spreads can be explained by the statistical and by the information effect. For small accounting noise the statistical effect dominates:
higher correlations increase the probability of extremely high and extremely low reported asset values, thus the low reported asset value becomes more probable.
For medium and large accounting noise the information effect dominates. When the investor receives a very low reported asset value and the correlation is high, he
anticipates that this low asset value might arise from the fact that the company reports a lower asset value than the true asset value.
In conclusion, for small accounting noise the statistical effect dominates in all three scenarios. One explanation for this behavior is that the leeway for earning management is very low if the accounting noise is low. For higher accounting noise, the management of the company has more possibilities for earnings management, and the earnings management has a greater impact. Therefore, for medium and high accounting noise the information effect is dominant.
Ignoring the Correlation: How Large is the Pricing Error?
In this subsection, I assume an investor who ignores that there is a correlation between the logarithm of the true asset value and the noise term. I try to quantify the pricing error the investor would make by ignoring the correlation. This is different from the situation in the previous subsection, because neglecting the correlation also introduces a different expected reported asset value so that the pricing error depends on the correlation effect described in the previous subsection and on the change in the expected reported asset value. I assume further that the investor has information about the asset value parameters as given in Table 1 . Moreover, he knows the noise parametersū and a. For the calculations, I assume that the expectation of the noise processū is −0.272 and the standard deviation of the noise process a equals 0.66.
4
The pricing error is calculated for two correlation scenarios. In the first scenario the correlation between ln(V ) and U is set to 0.4, in the second scenario the correlation is set to −0.4. For both scenarios, I again assume three different reported asset values of 120, 93.6, and 65.
The calculated pricing errors are plotted in Figure 6 . For all reported asset values and for both correlation scenarios, the credit spreads differ from the base case where a correlation of 0 is assumed. The pricing error can be positive or negative, depending on the reported asset value the correlation scenario. The pricing error for an investor who ignores that the logarithm of the true asset value is correlated with the noise term, is particularly high for short times to maturity. The calculated pricing errors demonstrate that ignoring the correlation between the true asset value and the noise term yields significant pricing errors, especially if the time to maturity is short.
Conclusion
In this paper, the model of Duffie and Lando (2001) was extended to the case where the logarithm of the true asset value and the noise term in reported asset values are bivariate normally distributed with a correlation different from zero. I provided theoretical motivation for the idea that this extension is important to better model the behavior of the management for reporting asset values. The theoretical consideration comes to the conclusion that the correlation between the logarithm of the true asset value and the noise term can be different from zero.
With the theoretical arguments at hand, I derived the conditional density of the true assets given the reduced information set consisting of the reported asset value and the information whether the company is in default. With the help of the conditional density, I calculated conditional probabilities of default, bond prices, and hypothetical credit spreads for corporate zero bonds. Furthermore, I showed that for usual parameters the correlation between the logarithm of the true asset value and the noise term is similar to the correlation between the true asset value and the noise term.
The analysis of the correlation effects demonstrates that introducing the correlation has two effects: a statistical and an information effect. The statistical effect is responsible for a new distribution of the reported asset value. The information effect arises from the anticipation of the correlation by the investor. In a numerical example it was shown that for small accounting noise the statistical effect dominates, while for medium and large accounting noise the information effect is dominant.
In the further analysis, I looked at the pricing errors in the credit spreads of corporate zero bonds that would arise if an investor ignored the correlation. For usual parametrizations, these pricing errors can have high positive and negative magnitudes, especially for short times to maturity.
My analysis in this paper shows that a correlation between the logarithm of the true asset value and the noise term has to be incorporated into the basis model of Duffie and Lando (2001) . There is theoretical and empirical evidence for such a component, and the effects of the correlation are of significant magnitude.
A Proof of Proposition 2
Q(τ > t|Y t ) is the integral of b(z|y, z 0 , t) with boundaries v b and ∞. From Proposition 1 it is known that b(z|y, z 0 , t) is given by
As one can see in Equation (21), b(z|y, z 0 , t) consists of two parts that can be integrated separately. To integrate the first part with respect to x, we have to bring the expression into the form of the density of a normally distributed variable.
Therefore, the exponent has to have the form
The values of A 1 , Q 1 , and D 1 are found by comparing the coefficients of
and J(ỹ,x,z 0 ). The values are
With the parameters A 1 , Q 1 , and D 1 the exponent in Equation (21) 
To write b 1 as the density of a normally distributed variable, I correct the term in front of the exponent. Using all information so far, b 1 can be written as
where φ(·) denotes the density of a standard normally distributed variable. Obviously, it is possible to rewrite b 1 as a constant times the density of a standard normal variable.
Rewriting the second part of Equation (21) is more difficult as it additionally involves x in e −2z 0x σ 2 t . Again, I rewrite b 2 as a normal density times a constant. Comparing coefficients in the exponential part of b 2 , I calculate the values for A 2 , Q 2 , and D 2 . This yields
The correction term C 2 of the exponent of b 2 is
The term b 2 can now be rewritten as a constant times a normally distributed variable
where φ(·) denotes the density of a standard normally distributed variable. Defining
Rewriting the integral of φ(·) as Φ(·) and inserting the integration bounds
Defining
gives the required result. Duffie and Lando (2001) are plotted for different levels of accounting noise a. In the first figure the reported asset value is set to 90. In the second figure the reported asset value is set to 72. For the other model parameters, the base case values are applied. Figure 3: In this figure the effect of the correlation and the accounting noise on credit spreads is plotted for a reported asset value of 120. For small accounting noise a, credit spreads decrease as the correlation ρ increases. For medium and large accounting noise a, credit spreads increase as the correlation ρ increases. Figure 5: In this figure the effect of the correlation and the accounting noise on credit spreads is plotted for a reported asset value of 65. For small accounting noise a, credit spreads increase as the correlation ρ increases. For medium and large accounting noise a, credit spreads decrease as the correlation ρ increases. Figure 6: In the first row, the credit spreads and the pricing errors are plotted for the case that the reported asset value is 120. In the second row, the credit spreads and the pricing errors are plotted for the case that the reported asset value is 93.6. In the third row, the credit spreads and the pricing errors are plotted for the case that the reported asset value is 65. In each of these cases I examine three correlation scenarios of 0, 0.4, and −0.4. 
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